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Russia once again reminds Europe that it is still “a riddle 
wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma,” to use Winston 
Churchill’s phrase. Its evolution from a “normal country” 
into the main threat to the continent’s tranquility started 
at the end of the last decade, and the process is far from 
complete. I believe it will take quite some time to realize 
just how profound the consequences of such a change 
will be for all Europeans. This paper asks a number of 
questions: What happened in Russia in these years? How 
do the current trends relate to the self-awareness of the 
Russian people? What kind of goals is Moscow pursuing? 
And what shape should the strategies of both the EU and 
Germany toward their eastern neighbor take?
The New Russia: Some Striking Features
Beginning in 2000, Russia’s economic downturn gave way 
to a recovery. This was the result of a serious devaluation 
of the ruble in 1998 and was subsequently supported by 
the rising prices of oil and other major Russian exports. 
Oil was particularly important, since it was the main fac-
tor that permitted the new Russian political elite to stay 
in power. The country had in the 1980s and 1990s been 
steadily moving toward democracy, but once elected to 
the presidency, the former KGB officer Vladimir Putin 
surrounded himself not with competent people but with 
personally loyal ones. His clique would not have been 
able to run the country if the main goal had been creation 
of wealth rather than its redistribution. 
Between 1999 and 2013, with each new period of Putin 
in power, oil revenues grew continually. It is worth recall-
ing that Russia’s oil output in 1999 was 304.8 million tons, 
while the average price of oil stood at $19.97 per barrel. 
One can deduce the actual size of Russia’s “windfall oil 
earnings” by subtracting the total value of oil pumped 
in 1999 from oil revenues of each consecutive year. For 
the first period (2000–03), for example, it totaled $133.7 
billion, or $33.5 billion a year; for the second period 
(2005–08) it was $894.4 billion, or $223.6 billion a year, 
while for the first part of Putin’s next term in the Kremlin 
(2011–13) it reached $1.3 trillion, or $394 billion per year.1 
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Such huge revenues allowed Putin’s power elite to commit 
practically any administrative error, tolerate unprofes-
sional decision making, and engage in all kinds of acts of 
favoritism, as oil revenues pushed the country forward 
despite ever-growing corruption. Starting in the critical 
period of 2003–04, public office became regarded as a 
special kind of “business” that would bring the biggest 
amount of cash with a minimum of risk and responsibility. 
And Russia’s president, whose close friends had already 
turned into oligarchs, made it repeatedly clear – using 
increasing bellicose terms – that he would not tolerate 
any attempt to change the country’s course.
Meanwhile, as the first decade of the 2000s came to an 
end, there was a sense within the expert community in 
Russia that the ruling clique was in the process of choos-
ing between two political systems: the “Mexican/Chi-
nese” model on one hand (which allows for a change of 
leaders while essentially presupposing single-party rule) 
and pure authoritarianism on the other (when the head 
of state, once brought on, is elected for life). The choice 
was most likely made between 2010 and 2011, when it 
became clear that Dmitry Medvedev (the “acting Presi-
dent,” as Putin used to call him) was predisposed toward 
compromise and ready to take a “softer” stance against 
the West. Certainly the “Arab Spring” revolutions in the 
authoritarian regimes of the Middle East had a significant 
impact on how the Russian elite drafted further policy. So 
did Western efforts to overthrow the Gaddafi government 
in Libya, which disturbed them deeply. Meanwhile the 
rapid easing of the economic crisis and oil price recovery 
persuaded Moscow that the regime faced no danger from 
a financial point of view. Putin’s return to the presidency 
in 2012 indicated two things: that he would never give up 
the position voluntarily and that he had totally lost his 
hopes for any positive engagement with the West. These 
two facts determine the reality that I call “Russia of the 
2010s.”
Russia of the 2010s is actually an authoritarian petro-
state, controlled by people who consider public service 
to be a kind of business and the state their own private 
property. Elites are recruited on the basis of loyalty to 
the supreme leader and his appointees, so they focus on 
maintaining stability rather than on promoting develop-
ment and change. The main element of the whole system 
is the exchange of loyalty for money; the leadership is 
keen to close its eyes to the “orderly” corruption and the 
misuse of any official position for personal gain if it al-
lows the political system to stay under firm control. This 
of course causes a steep decline in the efficiency of public 
spending but still allows the country to develop along the 
lines intended by the leadership. Fully aware of the actual 
extent of the corruption, the Kremlin prefers to under- 
invest in many projects and to channel money into 
reserve funds. The regime’s most important feature is 
therefore the priority it gives to its current goals at the 
expense of any prospective ones. This in short offers a 
quite narrow horizon of planning and an inability (and 
unwillingness) to change the existing order of things. 
All of this indicates that the system Putin created 
cannot be redesigned via mere reforms. It can only be 
dismantled by external – or internal – shocks. Vyacheslav 
Volodin, a stubborn deputy chief of staff in the Kremlin 
administration who famously coined the formula “No 
Putin, no Russia” at the annual Valdai Club session in 
Sochi last year, was in many aspects surprisingly correct.2 
Today’s Russia will not outlive Vladimir Putin.
The general public remains largely indifferent to what 
is going on and demonstrates a high degree of passive 
loyalty to the authorities. This may be explained by 
three main factors. First, the vast majority of citizens 
are satisfied with the sharp increase in the quality of life 
they experienced during the 2000s. Russians today live 
better than ever before, and because of this, their support 
for the current regime will remain stable for quite a long 
time. Second, Putin has masterfully exploited longstand-
ing Russian phobias, presenting his policy as one that op-
poses the West and blaming the outside world for most of 
Russia’s problems. This has successfully rallied the nation 
to his own agenda. Third, those who attempt dissent are 
either leaving the country in growing numbers or experi-
encing pressure and intimidation. With these strong fac-
tors consolidating Putin’s popularity, there seem to be few 
attractive alternatives to Putin’s course. Of course, the 
population’s passive loyalty should not be mistaken for ac-
tive endorsement – after all, the “pro-government” street 
rallies organized by the authorities often involve partici-
pants who have either been bussed in from provincial 
towns or simply paid money to shout favorable slogans – 
but the country’s leadership seems to be satisfied with the 
picture it sees.
One should recognize that a unique political system 
has been created inside today’s Russia. In it, authoritar-
ian rulers, virtually unbounded in their powers, are using 
those powers in a fairly moderate way, allowing most of 
the citizens to enjoy broad personal freedoms (freedom 
to do business, freedom to access information, freedom to 
leave the country and return, and so forth).3 This political 
regime may resist participating in information wars, does 
not require external support, and looks quite self- 
sufficient in economic matters.
The Russian authorities are well aware of the fact 
that they possess effective means of tackling the current 
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crises. For one thing, they believe that the decline in 
prices for all major export commodities cannot last long 
and that their calculations appear to be solid; for another, 
they can devalue the ruble any time they wish, thereby 
increasing the federal budget’s revenues, since approxi-
mately half of them are collected from custom duties de-
nominated in dollars. One should also point out that the 
Russian shadow economy amounts to up to 30 percent of 
the official economy, so that this sector may well smooth 
over the issue of unemployment (even if it does not 
remove it altogether from the current agenda). Moreover, 
most ordinary Russians are accustomed to distinguishing 
between problems caused by the personal actions of bu-
reaucrats and problems caused by “irreversible” economic 
circumstances, so no one should therefore expect falling 
oil prices to cause any serious troubles for Putin and his 
inner circle. All of this means that it will be some time 
indeed before the worsening economic conditions inspire 
a reaction on the part of society as a whole. The country is 
far more likely to “die slowly” than experience any kind of 
revolutionary upheaval. 
All of the above means that Europe will have to coexist 
with Putin’s Russia for at least another ten years – until 
the mid 2020s. What is needed now is an understand-
ing of how to manage coexistence and a sense of what 
European politicians – realistically – should strive for in 
the next decade.
Shedding the Old Illusions
The most important first step is to rethink old attitudes 
about Russia’s path of development – in other words, to 
abandon numerous illusions about the EU’s eastern neigh-
bor. Certainly, the moves taken by the Russian authori-
ties should not be regarded as a kind of deviation from 
a certain “norm” the European Union embodies. On the 
contrary, they should be treated as completely rational 
steps taken in pursuit of a single goal: preserving the 
existing political regime. It is futile to evaluate (or, even 
more, try to predict) any actions undertaken by Putin and 
his team according to traditional concepts of economic 
benefits and international legal order. The Russian presi-
dent’s objective is not to develop his country or improve 
it but rather to perpetuate his personal rule. One may 
therefore expect almost any move that can help secure a 
high level of support for him inside the country. This ap-
plies as much to his attitudes to the opposition as it does 
to his economic policies or to his behavior on the inter-
national scene. For these reasons, contemporary Russia 
should by no means be considered a power that will abide 
by international rules. As proven by the events in Crimea 
and in eastern Ukraine, Russia’s readiness or unwilling-
ness to comply with international treaties and agreements 
depends solely on the current political rationale.
Moreover, it must be assumed that, in contemporary 
Russia (in contrast to the first decade of the 2000s), politi-
cal objectives enjoy clear priority over economic ones. 
The decrees issued by Putin in May 2012 were unrealiz-
able and economically harmful from the very beginning 
– but they were intended to implement a series of populist 
measures aimed at improving his personal approval rat-
ings. Nor can the annexation of Crimea and the ongoing 
war in the Donbas be justified from an economic point of 
view, but Putin never doubted the wisdom of his actions. 
The “counter-sanctions” against imports of EU food only 
add to this series of bold but ill-thought-out decisions. 
The increasingly restrictive policy toward the business 
community further emphasizes the absolute predomi-
nance of politics over economics, which is the signature 
point of Russia of the 2010s. This means that Europe and 
the West in general have lost their essential tool for dia-
logue with Russia: their emphasis on economic coopera-
tion, on trade and development, on investment projects, 
and so forth. Nothing like a “partnership for moderniza-
tion” (that is, for economic growth, prosperity, financial 
openness – one may choose whatever goal one likes) is 
possible at this stage. Putin wants to increase Russia’s 
geopolitical weight as he sees it, not engage in bargain-
ing for economic concessions. Under such conditions, on 
the European side, it is the political, not the business elite, 
that should be drafting and executing the new agenda for 
dealing with Russia.
Finally, one needs to be aware of the fact that genuine 
civil society is inexistent in Russia. Indeed, there is not 
even a significant group of open-minded liberals in the 
country today. (The majority of intellectuals today are 
as attached to their liberal myths as their opponents are 
to conservative ones and will therefore never receive any 
significant support among the enlightened part of the 
public.) Among youth who share European values, there 
is only one dominant desire: to leave the country – that is, 
to take advantage of life in Europe while applying all their 
talents and capabilities to becoming “global citizens.” In 
2014 alone, some 300,000 people officially emigrated 
from Russia. This number is more than two times higher 
than emigration during all four years of Medvedev’s presi-
dency.4 (I should add with a deep regret that “promoting 
dialogue” with what is sometimes considered civil society 
in Russia means engaging in self-deception and sending 
misleading signals to the Russian public.)
Summarizing the above, Russia of the 2010s is on a 
course toward a “second cold war” with the West. Under 
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these circumstances, it wants to stay firm defending its 
“sphere of interests” from the political claims of both the 
EU and NATO; to assert its ideological doctrine, distinct 
from the Western doctrine of human rights; to perceive 
the economic ties and relations as useful but not decisive; 
and to label any opposition within the country as insti-
gated by “foreign agents” and financed and supported 
by hostile governments. Russia will continue its military 
provocations, will build up alliances with the opponents 
of West in any part of the globe, and will take further  
efforts to undermine the unity of both the EU and NATO.
Facing these developments, Europe and the West 
should not decline Russia’s dare. It needs to take the 
emerging showdown seriously. The West should mobilize 
the necessary resources to win the second cold war –  it 
will require much less effort than it took to win the first 
one.5 Today Russia tries to address Europe from the posi-
tion of strength – while actually possessing no strengths 
it can rely on. Europe, in my opinion, should approach 
Russia with the very same attitude – primarily because it 
has much more leverage over Russia than Russia has over 
Europe.
Consolidating a New Approach
The most appropriate strategy for Europe to use vis-à-vis 
Russia in this second cold war should encompass at least 
five points.
1) First of all, bilateral trade relations need fundamen-
tal revision. Today, Russia’s importance for Europe and 
Europe’s importance for Russia look massively dispropor-
tionate. In 2013 (based on the latest data available), the 
Russian Federation accounted for 12.3 percent of EU-28 
imports and 6.9 percent of its exports.6 For its part, Russia 
has shipped to the EU and Switzerland 52.8 percent of its 
exports, while receiving 42.6 percent of its imports from 
these countries.7 More than 67 percent of imports from 
Europe to Russia comprise cars, trucks, machinery, and 
equipment of critical importance to both Russian process-
ing industries and the production of energy resources. In 
turn, Russia’s largest state-owned company, Gazprom, 
delivered 63.4 percent of its total gas exports to the EU, 
gaining from this 45 percent of all its operational rev-
enues in 2014.8 
Any substantial reduction in trade with the EU would 
have catastrophic results for Russia’s economy, while for 
the most of Europe the effect would be relatively modest. 
One should take into consideration that during the first 
quarter of 2015, exports from Russia decreased by 29.6 
percent compared to the first quarter of 2014, while Ger-
many’s overall exports actually rose by 1.7 percent.9 
Europe should drastically reduce its energy depen-
dence on Russia and its export ties with Russia in general. 
As the first step I would propose reframing the coopera-
tion with Gazprom. The company must be demoted from 
its current position of predominant supplier of natural 
gas to just one of many commercial companies delivering 
energy resources to the EU. Taking into account the fall in 
oil prices, it is worth noting that, as of April 2015, the liq-
uefied natural gas (LNG) supplied either from the Middle 
East or from Trinidad costs about as much as pipeline gas 
from Russia was valued in February 2014. If European 
consumers agree not to economize on falling oil prices 
but instead to use this downward turn to replace Russian 
gas with LNG, such a move could do much to strengthen 
Europe’s energy security and bring some Moscow policy 
makers to their senses. 
I would say that the EU possesses all the technical ca-
pabilities for such a turn. In 2014 it purchased 121.3 billion 
cubic meters of natural gas from Gazprom10 and at the be-
ginning of that year had 182 billion cubic meters of excess 
capacity in regasification terminals in nine EU countries.11 
The EU could deliver another blow to Gazprom’s monopo-
ly if a gas pipeline connecting the shores of the Baltic and 
Adriatic seas is laid through Central European countries 
(countries currently dependent on supplies of Russian gas 
by 90 percent or more).12 
There is no need to cancel all gas supplies from Russia, 
moreover. Rather, the task consists of creating an infra-
structure capable of intimidating the Russians with such a 
move – and in this situation Moscow would become much 
more compliant. (For example, after the completion and 
commissioning on December 3, 2014 of an LNG terminal 
in Klaipeda, Lithuania operated by Klaipedos Nafta, Gaz-
prom immediately offered Lithuanian customers a 20+ 
percent discount on its gas and abandoned its take-or-pay 
principle.) It should be assumed that Russia may take 
some “asymmetric” measures in response to these restric-
tions in the gas trade, such as banning imports of several 
more kinds of European goods. But this would be a natu-
ral and tolerable price to pay for Europe’s energy security. 
The main objective of such a restrictive policy should 
be to accentuate the EU’s role as Russia’s major trading 
partner, even while some people in Moscow entertain 
the illusion that Russia can “re-orient toward the East,” 
substituting Europe with China, etc. The Europeans can 
afford such a bold policy change right now, whereas Rus-
sia certainly would not be able to redeploy even half of its 
energy deliveries to China before 2020–25. 
2) The Europeans should reconsider their investment 
and financial policies toward Russia. Certainly they must 
go further and deeper than they did in 2014. According to 
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figures for accumulated foreign direct investment (FDI), 
corporations from all EU-28 member states had chan-
neled more than €290 billion in FDI into Russia as of early 
2015, while European banks provided their Russian coun-
terparts with more than €300 billion via direct loans or 
bond purchases. In Russia itself, a unique financial situa-
tion has developed in recent years; the largest banks and 
companies preferred to get loans from abroad because of 
a stable ruble exchange rate and high interest rates in the 
domestic market. As a result, by early 2014, Russian com-
panies owed domestic lenders less money than they owed 
to foreign ones: RUR 18.8 trillion vs. $678 billion.13 
Financial sanctions imposed on Russia by the US and 
Europe have already put many Russian companies into a 
difficult position, and the problem will definitely worsen. 
Another $83.4 billion in loans, plus interest, are to be 
repaid by the end of 2015.14 It should be noted that Russian 
companies can these days get additional funding only 
from the state (from its reserve funds, to be more precise), 
while hopes of relying on China (hopes that actively cir-
culated in Moscow immediately after Western sanctions 
were imposed) have not been realized. As a result, Eu-
ropean banks now hold around 25 percent of the overall 
debt of Russian companies and banks, while European 
countries or corporations owe virtually nothing to Russia 
and Russian financial institutions.
The same applies to FDI. Despite the fact that statistics 
show a lot of FDI into Russia comes from offshore jurisdic-
tions, the EU-28 accounts for 70.3 percent of accumulated 
foreign investments, while China contributes a mere 
0.7 percent.15 Today many EU companies are consider-
ing terminating new investments in Russia and even 
the closure of already active projects. Given that they 
control 61 percent of passenger vehicle production, up 
to 50 percent of all refrigerators and washing machines 
assembled in Russia, as well as 35 percent of food and 
beer output, the punch can be quite significant. If such 
an “investment showdown” begins, Russia will have no 
adequate response. Its investments in EU countries are in-
significant. (As of January 1, 2012 they stood at €53 billion, 
or 1.3 percent of all FDI accumulated inside the EU-28.)16 
Mutual disinvestment both from the EU and Russia would 
therefore inflict serious damage on the Russian economy, 
while its impact on Europe would most likely hardly even 
be noticed. In my opinion, European countries may there-
fore take a tougher stance toward Russia without fearing 
substantial response.
The EU could, moreover, deal a much more serious 
blow to Russia’s financial sector if the latter continues its 
aggressive policies. In the same way that EU politicians 
banned European banks from providing loans to Russian 
companies, they may order the European stock exchanges 
to exclude Russian corporations from their trading lists 
and prohibit any EU financial institutions from holding 
Russian equity in their portfolios – even acting on behalf 
of their clients. To realize how powerful this blow could 
be, one should take into account that at the Moscow 
Stock Exchange today, up to 65 percent of equity dealings 
involve at least one foreign or foreign-controlled com-
pany, whereas around 50 percent of free-floating shares 
of Russian publicly traded companies are held by Western 
financial institutions.17 A ban on deals involving Russian 
equities could cause a catastrophic drop in prices and a 
sell-off of proportions unseen even in 1998, to say nothing 
of 2008. One can imagine how significant the decrease of 
Russian oligarchs’ fortunes would be in such a scenario. 
One need only recall here that the Russian side has no 
comparable means of retaliation at its disposal.
3) The third point is that the EU can even react to 
Moscow’s actions in a political way, accelerating the inte-
gration of some former Soviet republics into the EU. The 
simplest case could be that of the Republic of Moldova, 
whose admission to the EU would have a largely symbolic 
value but could become a very important step, since Mol-
dova would become the first case of the EU’s expansion 
into the territory of the Commonwealth of Independent 
States as it was created in 1991 after the collapse of the 
Soviet Union. Such a move would probably change the 
situation in the disputed territory of Transnistria, which 
may decide to reintegrate into Moldova shortly before 
that country’s accession to the EU. If this were to happen, 
the EU would once again prove its attractiveness to the 
post-Soviet states and at the same time demonstrate its 
ability to resolve longstanding political conflicts involving 
unrecognized state-like entities, the emergence of which 
have been largely caused by Russia’s policies. 
Of course, more proactive policy could be carried out 
toward Georgia, which could even acquire EU candidate 
status. (As the Turkish case shows, a state may enjoy such 
status for decades.) A similar policy could be applied 
toward Ukraine, which now appears to be a key point 
of intersection of both EU and Russian interests. I am 
convinced that granting EU candidate status to Ukraine 
is the best possible solution to the problem; for one thing, 
it would allow the EU to influence Ukrainian political 
reforms, and, for another, it would make Ukraine much 
more attractive to private foreign investment – without 
which any program of providing financial aid or credit 
restructuring will not contribute to sustainable economic 
revival. 
Finally, Europe might make a number of significant 
advances vis-à-vis Belarus, which formally is a part of 
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the EAEU and almost forms a “union state” with Russia 
but for a long time has implemented a strategy of balanc-
ing between Russia and its Western neighbors – a strategy 
that has become much more relevant since the Russian 
advances in Ukraine. Although the scenario of Belarus 
joining the EU is hardly realistic, heightened prospects of 
EU membership could nevertheless undermine the coun-
try’s ties with Russia quite significantly. And here again 
I should reiterate that in any of these cases Russia would 
have no opportunity to counter the EU’s actions.
4) If Russia continues to be as unfriendly in the future 
as it has been in recent months, another, fourth, response 
to Russia’s actions could be a series of restrictions im-
posed on EU-based assets held by Russian companies and 
citizens. The most radical option to consider is a ban on 
Russian citizens controlling commercial companies and 
owning real estate or any other assets in the EU worth 
over €200,000, as well as having accounts in European 
banks with a turnover exceeding, say, €75,000 per year. 
This would not affect students, visiting researchers, or 
the majority of Russians legally working in Europe – nor 
would it affect middle class Russians with vacation 
properties from Cyprus to Spain – but it would be a huge 
step for Europe to rid itself of Russian “dirty money.” In 
this case I would not suggest arresting the persons in 
question, or confiscating their property, but rather trying 
to “squeeze” Russian property out of the EU, both real 
estate and corporate holdings and bank accounts. (My 
colleagues and I have already proposed some of these 
methods before.18) 
Simultaneously a major search for offshore companies 
and trusts controlled by Russian beneficiaries should be 
conducted all over Europe. This could become the most 
powerful response to Russia’s aggressiveness and unpre-
dictability, since wealthy Russians – who like so much to 
decorate their Mercedes and Bentley cars with the Ribbon 
of St. George as a sign of supporting President Putin – 
would receive a clear signal that no one is allowed to 
mock European values and violate European norms while 
taking full advantage of the European legal system and 
enjoying the European way of life. Such a defiant cam-
paign against Russia’s wealthy would be the best thing 
the EU could do today to influence the Kremlin’s policies. 
Today, the majority of Russian citizens – including those 
who are financially solid and open-minded – do not see 
any negative personal consequences arising their coun-
try’s transformation into an aggressive authoritarian state. 
Europe could do quite a lot more to change their attitudes. 
If the EU took actions that clearly showed Putin’s Rus-
sia is not a part of Europe (or “not-Europe,” as Moscow 
claims), it would cool some hot heads, and Russian society 
would be pushed to rethink where the current leader-
ship is taking the country. Such a step would send a clear 
signal: the concessions have ended. Europe is definitely 
“not-Russia.” As long as Russia does not change, the EU 
will not consider Russia a friendly country and will not 
continue to pursue business as usual. Again, as in the 
other cases, Russian officials will have no means to re-
spond – and not only because the Europeans have not put 
their money into Russian real estate and do not hold their 
savings in Russian banks, but predominantly because 
all these actions would comply perfectly with Putin’s 
constant talk about the acute need to return “runaway” 
Russian capital to the country.
5) Finally, EU officials should pay much more attention 
to the presence within the EU of Putin-Versteher (Putin’s 
apologists).19 I refer here primarily to the fact that in 
recent years Moscow has actively recruited ideological al-
lies in Europe and is creating interest groups, in one form 
or another, that advocate the need to “respect” Russia’s 
policies, to soften sanctions against Russia, and to sup-
port contemporary Russia’s ideological foundations. What 
is the best way to respond to this? Without calling for a 
return to McCarthyism, I do consider it absolutely neces-
sary to run thorough checks on the financial interests of 
such groups and their business ties to Russia. 
In July 2012 the Russian parliament adopted a law on 
“foreign agents” according to which any non-profit organi-
zation can be considered a foreign agent if it receives any 
funding from foreign entities. (This even includes honors 
and prizes with a financial element.) Formally such status 
does not impose special restrictions on a particular NGO, 
but in fact it practically deprives it of the opportunity to 
apply for funding within the country and puts its activi-
ties under scrutiny. Not to mention the fact that political 
parties and associations, as well as individual politicians 
running for office, have no right to draw on financing 
either from foreign individuals and legal entities or from 
their Russian subsidiaries. I suggest that the EU respond 
to this with similar measures: first, by introducing at the 
pan-European level the same kind of ban on financing 
political parties and political campaigns by legal entities 
and private persons originating from countries that are 
classified by Human Rights Watch as “unfree” or “partial-
ly free”; and second by introducing the label “aggressor’s 
agent” for application to any organization that receives 
financing or support from the Russian state or Russian 
citizens. 
Much as the law on “foreign agents” is used in Russia, 
“aggressor’s agent” status in the EU would cause no formal 
prohibitions and restrictions within Europe, but it would 
contribute to a specific public image of such entities. I be-
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lieve that if Europe realizes that Moscow has once again 
become a cold-war adversary, then it should stop pretend-
ing that it is dealing with a normal democratic country.
We should recall that the EU has never acted aggres-
sively against either Russia or its neighboring states. It 
has always respected Russia’s sovereign right to create 
any kind of order, to adopt any laws within its own juris-
diction, and to subject its own nationals to those laws. It 
was Russian aggression against Ukraine, its occupation of 
Crimea, and Moscow’s active participation in an unde-
clared war in the Donbas that changed the situation. Vio-
lating the established order in Europe (so far, some states 
have broken up, but never before has one state appro-
priated part of another), Russia deprived Europe of any 
alternative to imposing economic sanctions. In response 
to these sanctions, Russia has launched a second cold war 
with the West. It seeks to undermine Europe’s unity and 
openly rejects and disregards European values. At this 
stage, any acquiescence on the part of the Europeans in-
volves waiving Europe’s hard-won values and denying the 
lessons of history, as well as betraying those who are com-
mitted to these values in the countries neighboring the 
EU. In the long run, such a policy would lead to surrender 
– even if the opponent is obviously weaker. I believe that 
taking a “pacifying” course would be a terrible mistake 
– especially at a time when the enemy profoundly overesti-
mates its strength.
The Crucial Issue of Timing
Europe, confronting the challenge posed by Russia in this 
second cold war, should remain well aware of two key 
facts. 
The first fact to keep in mind is an obstacle: Russia of 
the 2010s is a stable structure, both economically and 
politically. After annexing Crimea and supporting a war 
in eastern Ukraine, the regime was able to convert Rus-
sia’s economic problems into political capital, just as it 
had previously converted its economic achievements into 
political capital. Europe’s strategy for fighting the second 
cold war should therefore not focus on “undermining” 
the regime (to say nothing of “crushing” it) – for this goal 
seems totally unrealistic, even in the long run. Rather, 
European politicians must exclude Russia from their cur-
rent agenda to the greatest extent possible. This means 
freezing bilateral economic relations, freezing political 
dialogue, and even freezing cooperation among NGOs. 
This will oblige Moscow to solve the problems it has cre-
ated entirely on its own. 
Europe should come to terms with the fact that Russia 
is not going to make its European choice – and instead 
refocus its attentions on those countries that are willing 
to make such a choice. The second cold war, unlike the 
first one, does not presuppose an immutable boundary 
between the two spheres of influence. On the contrary, its 
essence lies in constant attempts to move that boundary 
in one direction or another, and the winner will be the 
one who succeeds in pushing the opponent further. For 
the next ten or even 15 years, European foreign policy 
should deprive Russia of the preferred status that it 
enjoyed for over two decades – and instead bestow that 
favored position on the nations located between Russia 
and the EU.
The second fact for Europe to keep in mind is not an 
obstacle but an advantage: Russia cannot stay opposed 
to the Western world for an indefinitely long time. Rus-
sia of the 2010s, while shifting its focus from economic 
factors and goals to political ones, will be forced again 
and again to sacrifice economic opportunities to political 
expediency. Furthermore, the logic of “politicizing” the 
everyday agenda will oblige authorities to continually ac-
centuate the situation both in foreign and domestic policy. 
This will ultimately undermine the regime, which will 
eventually collapse as its stability decreases – not from 
revolution or coup d’etat but simply because it stopped 
delivering adequate economic results. An unprofitable 
company cannot expand to new markets. In the same way, 
the state whose maintenance requires greater cost than 
the benefits in can deliver is doomed. 
I predict that the end of Putin’s Russia will resemble 
the end of the Soviet Union. The incentive to take respon-
sibility for governing a bankrupt nation will diminish, 
leading to a kind of implosion, as frustration grows over 
meaningless efforts and numerous mistakes.20 The most 
important effect of this on Russia’s foreign policy will be 
the realization that Russia has no alternative to Europe. 
Neither China nor the Central Asian nations can give the 
country impetus equivalent to its cooperation with the 
West. But by this time, Europe should be prepared to deal 
with a new Russia.
Toward an Agenda for Tomorrow
Russia seems to become dangerous in those periods of 
its history when it tries to confront the West. One may 
acknowledge that such periods were plentiful and rather 
long. But this means that Europe is trained in building 
relationships with the East under challenging condi-
tions. When Moscow begins to seek a rapprochement 
with Europe, however, it will turn out that the latter is 
not ready to accept Russia as an equal partner (which it 
would not become under any circumstances), but as one 
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of many European nations, equally deserving participati-
on in the process of pan-European integration. So, as we 
talk of “Russia of the 2010s,” we must understand that the 
course now chosen by the Kremlin’s leaders will inevita-
bly culminate in “Russia of the 2020s” – that is, in a weak 
and frustrated country possessing no alternative to trying 
once again to find its place in a more successful Europe.
After the Soviet Union’s defeat in the first Cold War, 
both the US and the EU pursued the wrong policy toward 
Russia, regarding it as a “normal country” (one of many 
located outside their immediate zone of influence). Thus 
they repeated the very mistake they had committed with 
regard to Germany in the 1920s. As a result of that miscal-
culation, Germany, stung by defeat in World War I, was 
left to its own devices and evolved into a revenge-seeking 
Nazi power that soon unleashed World War II. Similarly, 
contemporary Russia has been abandoned by the Western 
world for two decades. It is now launching the second 
cold war despite – or perhaps, more suitably, because of – 
its defeat in the first one. My conclusion is obvious: even 
while it should currently pursue a strict and effective 
policy of alienating and neglecting Putin’s Russia, Europe 
should prepare to immediately exchange this for a policy 
of engagement as soon as Russia expresses its desire for 
reconciliation.
I see the biggest challenge facing the contemporary EU 
as the challenge of drafting this agenda for reconciliation 
and integration once the second cold war has been won. 
The task will in fact be much harder than resisting Putin’s 
Russia during the unpleasant times ahead. The story of 
Russia “getting up from its knees” – now manifesting 
itself in a denial of certain international norms and the 
occupation of part of another sovereign state – proves that 
Europe cannot feel safe as long as Russia is not an integral 
part of Europe itself. This recalls the situation that existed 
in Europe between 1870 and 1945, when none of the Euro-
pean powers could sleep well because of a Germany that 
also “arose from the rubble.” It was because of Germany’s 
“rise” that outstanding theorists first invented the doctrine 
of a united Europe and outstanding practitioners later 
implemented it. These days, with regard to Russia, the 
same kind of strategy looks like the most promising one.21
In terms of its history and culture, Russia has always 
been a European country, although significantly lagging 
behind the western part of the continent in its develop-
ment. Europeans today have no more important task than 
to convert the goal of effecting “a great reconnection” 
between Russia and the EU into a new “national idea” 
for a post-Putin Russia. I see no serious obstructions to 
implementing such a project. These days (as well as in the 
future) Russia is indispensable for continuing the EU’s 
economic development. It has a huge and well-trained 
pool of labor that, if the current Russian economic trends 
continue, will never find a decent occupation for itself 
inside the country; it has a tremendous stock of natural 
resources that could make Europe energy- and commod-
ity-independent for decades; and, last but not least, it is 
a great and prospective market, which will grow even 
bigger if Russia becomes a part of European integrationist 
efforts. The country’s history also shows that an emphasis 
on russkost’ (Russianness) is generally inadvisable for 
Russia; every time the nation focuses on its own unique-
ness, it arrests its development and ends in some kind 
of turmoil. In contrast, during the times it shows open-
ness to universalist ideas, Russia is able to reach peaks of 
power. 
All of this suggests that a common pan-European  
project – the act of joining the capabilities of the EU to 
those of Russia – could not only become the basis for a 
lasting peace in Europe but also result in the revival of 
“wider Europe” as the unrivaled economic and political 
center of the 21st century. 
Many scholars and policy makers today assume that 
Russia cannot be accepted into the EU because of its large 
population and enormous landmass. However, these 
are false and exaggerated concerns. It is strange to hear 
the argument that, were this to happen, Europe would 
acquire porous borders with China and the countries 
of Central Asia. Even if the residents of these countries 
were able to enter Russia freely, the border between the 
Russian Federation and those of other EU countries could 
be kept well guarded. If economic issues are taken into 
account, Russia is now not bigger in terms of its GDP 
than France or Italy, so no Russian dominance should be 
expected. On the contrary, I cannot imagine any more 
economically stimulating step for the rise of both Europe 
and Russia than Russia’s acceptance into the eurozone. 
The country has a minor public debt, contrary to Greece 
or Spain; its positive trade balance is slightly smaller than 
that of Germany, so the adoption of a stable currency with 
extra low interest rates could result in an economic boom 
that would be second only to China’s – while benefiting 
the whole of Europe. The imposition of the EU acquis 
communautaire on Russia – even on the condition that the 
country itself would not be able to participate in its devel-
opment for ten to 15 years – could easily transform Russia 
into a state with a strict legal order. One need only look at 
the Baltic countries to see that the ethnic Russians living 
there are as decent and law-abiding as the vast majority 
of other Europeans.
The crucial challenge for contemporary Russia is its 
inability to adhere to the laws and rules it adopts. In 
Russia of 2010s: How to Live with It and How to Outlive It  8
DGAPkompakt  / Nr. 7 / June 2015
DGAPkompakt  / Nr. 7 / June 2015
The opinions expressed in this publication are those 
of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the 
views of the German Council on Foreign Relations 
(DGAP). 
Editing  Miranda Robbins
Layout   Andreas Alvarez
Design Concept  Carolyn Steinbeck · Gestaltung 
© DGAP 2015 
Publisher  
Prof. Dr. Eberhard Sandschneider, Otto Wolff 
Director of the Research Institute, DGAP e.V.
ISSN 1611-7034 
Rauchstraße 17 / 18  .  10787 Berlin
Tel. +49 (0)30 25 42 31 -0 / Fax -16
info@dgap.org  .  www.dgap.org
Dieses Werk ist lizenziert unter einer Creative Commons Namensnennung – Nicht kommerziell – Keine Bearbeitungen 4.0 International Lizenz.
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution – NonCommercial – NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.
Russia, personal authority has always been placed above 
any right – and today this is more pronounced than ever 
before. No one should hope to change this – as the West 
once hoped to in the 1990s – through advice and counsel. 
Russia will become a “normal” country only when its 
laws will be installed from the outside and when there 
will be no chance to change them because of the will of 
some new lieutenant-colonel suddenly propelled to power 
in the Kremlin. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
Europe had a unique chance to bring Russia into the fold 
of “normalcy,” but it missed its opportunity. A new oppor-
tunity should not be botched. Indeed, in the midst of the 
current showdown, Europeans should devote their major 
efforts to drafting an appropriate new strategy: a strategy 
for engaging with Russia in the post-Putin era.
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